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I. Introduction
No matter what they make, do, or sell, every single organization in the world relies
ultimately on one thing: people. Whether working for a company, a campaign, or a
cooperative, the quality of the people involved has a direct impact on the success
achieved therein. In an attempt to make the most of the workers that they have nearly
every organization across the globe undertakes some level of training. Whether
demonstrating how to use a hammer or holding a week-long retreat on corporate culture
and structure, it is difficult to find an organization that does not have some form of
training or another. Through training the organization hopes to improve the quality or
quantity (or both) of the produced output. Training is an improvement in human capital
of the organization by means of an investment in the individual.' This investment is not
without costs. Instructional materials, foregone production of instructors, and travel costs
are some of the ways in which organizations pay for training. As with any cost of
production, the cost of training must be kept to a minimum for the organization to
continue forward in its work. Since organizations create training curricula based on what
they think their people might eventually need, it is difficult to measure the exact marginal
returns from trailing. Perhaps the simplest way to maximize the return from training is
not to focus on or limit the amount of training each individual receives, but rather to limit
the number of people the firm has to train by reducing turnover in the workforce. In
industries where turnover is traditionally high, such as retail sales, reduction in that

' Kline (1993) discusses the commitment that a firm makes in en^loyees by investing resources in training
on machines and software. Here training is expanded to include interpersonal skills and company-specific
procedures.

turnover could improve the overall well-being of that industry.^ With applications
ranging from strengthening a post-draft military to increasing volunteer hours at the local
food bank, turnover reduction has important implications. Here, training investments will
be explored in the context of a university’s residence life (or ‘dorm’) system, though
extensions to many other applications may easily be made.

IL Example for Analysis
Post-secondary education involves the interaction of many seemingly disparate units.
Academics, sports, co-curricular opportunities, and social activities each play an
important role in the overall educational experience at a college or university. One such
co-curricular endeavor is student employment. Departments on every university campus
have come to depend upon work done by undergraduate students in a wide variety of
tasks. Unfortimately for those departments, the average undergraduate student spends an
only four or five years at the university before moving on. This means that in the best
case scenario, where freshman fill all available positions and continue the same job for
the tenure of their undergraduate education, departments can expect to lose between onefourth and one-fifth of their workforce every year. In the Office of Residence Life
(OUR) at Western Washington University (WWU), the majority of students employed as
Resident Advisors will work in that position for only one or two years. This means that
the OUR regularly loses more than half of its workforce annually. Antidote suggests that
a similar pattern exists at other universities. If students were hired and trained in their
freshman year for employment beginning their sophomore year and those same

^ BLS (2006) provides turnover as a percent of employment. For the period between September 2005 and
August 2006, Retail Sales, Accommodation and Food Services, and Leisure and Hospitality had the highest
turnover whereas Education, Finance and Insurance, and Wholesale Trade had the lowest industry turnover
rates.

individuals continued to work the following three years, turnover could be reduced to
one-third of the workforce each year. Should departments such as the OUR concern
themselves with retaining individuals from year to year? If so, how should this task be
accomplished? Using primarily microeconomic cost-analysis on the former question and
game theory for the latter, the OUR of WWU will provide a backdrop for an investigation
that has implications in a myriad of industries.

III. Improving Returns from Training
As an organization in at high-tumover industry, the Office of University Residences
(OUR) of Western Washington University (WWU) has a vested interest in exploring the
impact of such turnover on the organization. Students employed as Resident Advisors
(RA’s) often work only one year, with a minority working two or perhaps even three
years. Since RA’s act as the principle agents and inputs in providing “secure,
comfortable, and affordable housing.. .within a diverse community that encourages
academic success and personal growth,” should the OUR concern itself with improving
the rate of returning RA’s in an effort to provide the best service possible?
A. Equations
To build an accurate picture of the cost of “producing” or training RAs, consider the
following variables and equations:^
Qa = Number of new applicants, where Qa ^
On = Number new RAs, where (Jn ^
Qr = Number returning RAs, where Qr ^
Qt = Number total RAs, where Qt = Qr + On
ai(X) = Cost of placing X-type RA, where N = New and R = Returning
7 = Peer effects of returning RAs helping to mentor and to train new RAs
Of = Fixed cost of new RA class
(Xv = Variable cost of new RA class (buttons, copies, group leaders, etc.)
jS = cost of training one RA for fall (same for New and Returning RAs)
a = Cost of new RA selection process, per applicant
^ Katz and Rosen (1998) provides theoretical basis for analyzing costs of production.

The cost of training and placement for a new RA can then be modeled by:
Cn = a*QA + On* cj(n) + a + aV*Qn +
(E. 1)
The cost of returning an RA, including both placement and fall training, is expressed by:
CR = QR*co(r) + ^QR-7*QR (E.2)
Total cost of training and placement is simply the sum of (E.l) and (E.2):
Ct = Cr + Cn (E.3)
Expanded and re-arranged, (E.3) becomes:
Ct = a*QA + oiF + Ofv*QN + Qn* w(N) + Qr*

co(R)

+

+ Qr) - 7*Qr (E-3’)

Marginal Cost of a New RA (the derivative of E.3’ with respect to Qr):
MCn = c«)(N) + Ofv + jS (E.4)
Marginal Cost of a Returning RA (the derivative of E.3’ with respect to Qr):
MCR = a)(R) + i8-7

(E.5)

B. Assumptions
As in any model, a framework must be developed to work within. The following
paragraphs explain the clarifying assumptions that will structure the discussion about the
‘production’ or training of RA’s.
(1) At least one new RA must be trained each year.

Even if all RA’s would like to continue their position the next year, given that
employment as an RA in the OUR is dependant upon continued enrollment at WWU one
can assume that at least one new RA must be trained each year. To further strengthen
this assumption, consider further that not every RA will return (choosing instead to study
abroad, for example) and that nearly every year an RA will leave the position midyear.
(2) Number ofapplicants Qa is exogenous to the OUR.

The firm, OUR, has no control over number of new applicants. Once the position is
advertised, some number of students from WWU apply. The OUR, as with any firm

publicly advertising a position, cannot control who applies, though they can later control
who is interviewed and eventually hired.
(3) Peer Effects are felt only in communities with returning RAs.^

Some effect exists from having experience RAs to help along new RAs. If no Returner is
available to help the New RAs, then no peer effect will exist. When present the peer
effect reduces the cost to the OUR through mentorship and modeling of appropriate
behavior.
(4) The Placement Cost for New RAs is greater or equal to that ofReturning RAs.

With the strengths and weaknesses of New RAs relatively unknown, at least as much
effort must be used in placing them when compared with the known-quality Returners.
C. Implications
Combining the above equations and clarifying assumptions results in a conclusion on
whether or not the OUR should work to retain RAs. Looking at the marginal costs in the
best-case scenario where a)(N) = a)(R), two differences appear between new and
returning RAs. First, new RAs have the added cost of their participation in the new RA
training course. Second, retxmiing RAs benefit the OUR through their peer effect. It
follows logically that the OUR should hire as many returners as possible to maximize the
peer effect while simultaneously reducing the cost of the new RA training course. As the
cost of placement for new RAs is (more realistically) set above that of returning RAs, the
advantages to hiring as many returning RAs as possible becomes even more evident.

^ De Bartolome (1990) defines peer effects as “the presence of the more able” having a “large favorable
effect” on the less able, “perhaps by inparting higher motivation.” On the job experience is transferred
from returning employees to new employees through informal ongoing training. The exanple that
returning employees set, according to de Bartolome, significantly affects the work of new enployees.

IV. Market Structure and Selection
A. Current Structure
Having established that it is in the best interest of the organization to return as many
people as possible from year to year, the question of how to best accomplish this task
comes to the forefront. Since the decision to return to or continue within an organization
involves strategic interaction between a principal (an employer, for example) and an
agent (such as an employee), it makes sense to engage this question of how to retain
employees from a game-theoretic perspective. Four things must be defined in order to
properly go about such an analysis: players, rules, payoffs, and strategies. Using the
above framework from the OUR, the two players are defined as the OUR professional
staff (which includes Resident Directors, or RDs) as the principal and RAs as the agent.
The RA will choose first whether or not to return, followed by the decision by the OUR
to offer a position (P) or not, with the RA making the final move deciding whether or not
to accept the offered position. Since there are various communities in which a position
can be offered, it is assumed that each RA prefers one or more positions (PO over all
others.^ In view of the fact that difficulties arise both in quantifying and in generalizing
valuations of P and P', payoffs will be given ordinally rather than cardinally. This
formulation allows for easy comparison of outcomes even though an empirical “bestresponse” cannot be readily calculated. The following three examples consider different
possible characteristics of RAs who desire to return. Most - if not all -returners can be
classified by one of these three types, with the payoffs listed to the RA first and the OUR
second:^

* Krautmaim and Oppenheimer (1994) puts forth the idea that preferences exist within individuals, which
are “affected by things like location-specific amenities.”
Dixit and Skeath (2004) provides the basic structure for the examination of extended form games.

Type 1

Type 1 RAs show motivation to return, even if the preferred placement, P', is guaranteed
to not be offered.

Type 2 RAs are slightly more difficult to please from the OUR point of view. Once an
RA of this type has committed to return, they would accept any placement offered to
them. On the other hand, at some given probability that P is not P - denoted Prob(P ?P')this type of RA will deem that the option to not return has a better payoff than the
weighted average of taking some position P.

RAs of type 3, like those of type 2, base their decision to return on some probability that
they will be given one of their preferred placements. Unlike RAs of type 2, however,
type 3 RAs would prefer to not accept an offer of placement should the offer be other
than their preferred placement. The type 3 returner places an even greater importance on
the probability of being offered their preferred placement than their type 2 counterparts.
Given these three types of returners and their strategies, what should the OUR do? The
literature suggests some kind of pre-game signal be used to indicate the type of RA each
potential returner, but even this is not without problems. The OUR currently attempts to
take into account the preferences of potential returning RAs by just such a signal. The
RA who considers returning is asked by their supervising RD which placements would be
preferred. Unfortunately, RDs are faced with a conflict of interest in that they must
represent the preferences of their current RAs while concurrently working to create a new
staff-team for the following year. Compounding this tension, RAs are only offered a
single placement which they must accept or reject. This leads to a potentially two-fold
disappointment. First, RAs that might have been great returners are either discontent
with where they end up, or they simply quit. The latter gives way to the second
disappointment, where the RD depending on the quitting RA is left with one less

returning staff member. Recall that, as shown above, the best outcome for the OUR is to
return as many RAs as possible. So again, what should the OUR do?
B. Proposed Selection Model
The frictions with the current system come from two main sources: a conflict of interest,
and the one-shot nature of the placement. By allowing RAs to act directly in their best
interest and work directly with their potential supervisors, both of these frictions can be
resolved. RAs could apply directly to the RD of the community (or the RDs of the
communities) which they would prefer.^ RAs could apply to each community in which
they would like to work - signaling their preferences - and RDs would be able to act
accordingly. This new selection process can be modeled by the following:

Now that RAs only apply to communities (or to RDs) that they prefer, the difference
between case 1 and case 2 lies in RD’s payoffs. In case 1, the RD turns down the
application to return of the RA. In case 2, the RD and RA ‘match,’ resulting in best
outcome for all parties. In these two cases, RAs still apply to RDs from whom they will
be rejected - which could result in excessive administrative costs that outweigh the
benefits of returning more RAs. A pre-game signal where RDs and RAs expose whether

^ The added cost of applying to each community in which the RA wants to work should decrease the
number of such applications, with RAs only applying to those RDs with whom they have the greatest
chance of success. Guasch and Weiss (1981) explores the phenomenon of self-selection from which this
assertion comes.
* Farrell and Rabin (1996) proposes that “given people respond to it, talk definitely affects payoffs.” Such
talk is particularly effective when the parties involved have “no reason to lie.”

or not they ‘match’ would reduce this excessive paper process.^ The pre-game signal
might be facilitated by an open house of sorts where prospective returners sound out their
preferred RDs, This raises a third case, where uncertainty exists for the RD in whether or
not an RA would ‘match’ or not. This third case can be modeled as a probability of being
either case 1 or case 2. In any event the signal would reduce the amount of cases known
to be of type 1, presumably matching as many returners as possible in an efficient, openmarket manner.
C. Further Market Effects of the Proposed Selection Model
Each community served by the OUR has distinct characteristics which make it either
preferred or not by potential returning RAs. Conceivably, some communities could be
desired by a number of RAs that is greater than the number of positions there, or perhaps
no one prefers a given community. This conveys valuable information to those in charge
at the OUR.'° The OUR could act to change the amount of remuneration for positions on
the basis of desirability, as measured by the number of applicants. The OUR might seek,
for example, to increase compensation for those positions that are seen as less desirable
as a result of, say, a perception of higher conduct levels within a community or the more
stringent programming standards of a given RD. * * Such actions would even out the
number of returners in each community, and coupled with the absolute increase in RAs
due to better matching of preferences, the OUR decreases the cost of training new RAs
while improving the quality of the service that they provide to the campus.

Such a pre-game signal is facilitated when RDs and RAs both want the same thing: good
en^loyee/employer compatibility. Crawford and Sobel (1982) find that “there may be a good case for
presuming that direct commimication is more likely to play an inportant role, the more closely related are
[the] agents’ goals.”
Riley (1979)
" Weiss (1980) argues that wages should exhibit downward rigidity should the firm want to reduce labor
turnover. In other words, paying more for less desirable placements is not equivalent to the same as paying
less for mqre desirable placements.

VI. Further Complications
The proceeding sections show that the organization is best-served when they retain more
people from year to year, and that the best way to keep people is by allowing them to act
for themselves in market-based competition. In the application of these findings the
market, however, a few complications arise.
A. RD/Community Conflict
One such complication is that RDs may or may not return to the same community from
year to year. In such a case would the RD pick returning staff members for the
community in which they work now, or for the community in which the RD will be
working? A “cut-and-choose” method would most evenly spread out talent amongst
different staffs.*^ Equivalent to one child cutting a doughnut and another picking first
which piece to take, the cut-and-choose method encourages a fair distribution. The
“cutting” step would consist of each RD working to create the best community possible
for the commumty in which the RDs are currently placed. The “choose” step, then,
would be either a random assignment of RDs to communities or through some other
process deemed fair by all the RDs involved.
B. Cost of RA-RD Interaction
Bargaining has costs, even if the only cost is the time lost to the individuals involved. It
is conceivable that the sheer number of returning applications to each RD could make
such a system of direct, market-based application so costly as to outweigh the
advantages.'^ To avoid this, a limit on the number of returning applications each RA can
submit to RDs could be implemented. Such a rule would also encourage RAs to partake

Dawson (1997)
Cramton (1991) talks in depth about the “transaction cost of bargaining.”

in a pre-application signaling process with RDs, increasing the likelihood that the
applications they do submit would yield positive results.

VI. Conclusion
While this paper has focused on high-tumover industry, applications extend much
further. The uncertainty of tomorrow makes it impossible for organizations to train their
people in exactly what they will need to know. Training must supply a set of useful tools
or techniques that the individual can then apply to whatever situation might arise. The
skills taught vary by organization, but one thing remains constant: retaining trained
people from this time period to the next improves the return from training. By keeping
current employees, the firm not only has to pay less for overall training, but it also reaps
the benefits of experience and peer effects. Often the problem lies within the structure of
the organization, as it restricts the ability of well-qualified people to return from year to
year. Introspective analysis as to the particularities can result in a more streamlined
process, though the exact details would differ in each organization. Perhaps this means
instituting regular wage increases, or perhaps adjusting the process through which
individuals are chosen to return for another season. Whatever the particular solution, the
organization requires a certain flexibility with regards to returners. People like options,
and the more options that they are given to return, the more likely they will. Only in
retaining more highly-qualified people can the best outcomes be achieved. After all, it is
the people that ultimately make or break the organization.
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